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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
from which fund medical and funeral expenses are to be paid.175 In
the instant case, the petition allocated the expenses to the survival
action. The court, however, after inquiry of the trial court, upheld this
allocation. Noting that attorneys' compensation is not an element of
damages in either cause of action, the court further held that counsel
fees should be charged separately against each recovery.176
SUMMARY PROCEEDING
Summary proceeding: Landlord, by its excessive delay, forfeited right
to summary resolution of claims.
A summary proceeding under article 7 of the Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law provides an expeditious means for a
landlord to recover possession of his real property.177 Gramford Realty
Corp. v. Valentin'78 involved three summary nonpayment proceedings
by a landlord which had immediately ceased to demand rent after
acquiring an apartment building in June, 1971, and had billed its
tenants in June, 1972, for the total amount then due. The tenants, who
had paid nothing in the interim, were unable to pay. Although the
tenant's defense of equitable estoppel179 failed for lack of evidence,180
the New York City Civil Court, New York County, relying on its
inherent power to prevent injustice, dismissed the proceedings, without
prejudice, however, to an action to collect the accrued rents.18' The
court held that "by its excessive delay, the landlord ... forfeited the
right to resort to summary proceedings."' 82
175 Id. at 139, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
176 Id. at 134, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 590. See In re Estate of Bruno, 36 Misc. 2d 909, 233
N.YS&2d 913 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1962).
177 Cotignola v. Lieber, 34 App. Div. 2d 700, 701, 309 N.YS.2d 498, 499 (3d Dep't 1970)
(mem.); Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger, 41 Misc. 2d 988, 989, 246 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
17871 Misc. 2d 784, 337 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
179 "The answer may contain any legal or equitable defense, or counter-claim." RPAPL
743. See Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger, 41 Misc. 2d 988, 246 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y.C. Civ.
CL N.Y. County 1964). The tenants claimed that the landlord sought a means of removing
them, without the eviction certificate required by N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws tit. 23, § 51 et
seq. (McKinney App. 1969), by deliberately postponing rent collection until they were
unable to pay the accumulated rent due. The court, considering this contention, found
the tenants' reliance on Midman Realty Corp. v. Kane, 165 N.Y.L.J. 13, Jan. 20, 1971, at
19, col. 4 (N.Y. Civ. CL N.Y. County), to be misplaced. 71 Misc. 2d at 785, 337 N.Y.S.2d at
162. The tenants therein tendered the rent.
180 Leave of court is required for use of disclosure devices in special proceedings.
CPLR 408.
18171 Misc. 2d at 786, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 163. The tenants may also raise the defense of
equitable estoppel in such an action. For rents coming due after the commencement of the
summary proceedings, the landlord may bring new summary proceedings against the tenants
after appropriate demand. Id.
182Id. The court distinguished the requirement of RPAPL 711(2) that a landlord's
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
This decision, to be read on its unique facts, is a meritorious ap-
plication of a court's authority to prevent misuse of summary pro-
ceedings.
DoLrE v. Dow CHEMICAL Co.
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent developments.
In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 88 the Court of Appeals revolu-
tionized New York law by eliminating the active-passive test for
indemnification and allowing equitable apportionment of damages
among joint tortfeasors based on relative responsibility. In Kelly v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 84 the Court confirmed that a Dole claim
can be made by cross-claim against a co-defendant as well as by im-
pleader of an unjoined co-tortfeasor or by a separate indemnity
action.'8 5
A number of New York courts'88 and one federal court'8 7 have
also permitted defendants to seek a Dole apportionment by counter-
claim against plaintiffs suing in a representative capacity or in more
than one capacity. The decision with the greatest potential impact has
waiver of these proceedings be expressed in writing as a Statute of Frauds protection, not
designed to interfere with a court's power to prevent abuse of summary proceedings.
For examples of waiver by a landlord, see Fanchild Investors, Inc. v. Cohen, 43 Misc.
2d 39, 250 N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1964); Valentine Gardens Coopera-
tive, Inc. v. Oberman, 237 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1963).
183 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), noted in 37 ALiANy L. REv.
154 (1972); 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 815 (1972); 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 185 (1972). For an extended
discussion of the ramifications of Dole by Professor David D. Siegel, see 7B McKINNEY's
CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 205-38 (1972).
184 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
185 For discussion of the problem of the waiver of Dole rights, see 7B MCKINNEY's
CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 230-32 (1972) (strongest case for waiver where tortfeasor
fails to cross-claim against co-defendant); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution
in New York Law, 47 ST. Jon's L. REv. 185, 208 (1972) (waiver problem should be avoided
by resolving all issues arising from breach of duty in one action).
In Henriquez v. Mission Motor Lines, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 782, 339 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1972), the defendants sought a Dole charge based on the service of a notice of
"vouching in" after the jury had been selected. Since the plaintiffs received notice of the
defendants' claim, the court treated it as a counterclaim, but disallowed it for laches,
without prejudice to a subsequent action for Dole indemnity.
The common-law device of "vouching in" is "simply a notice that an action is
pending, and an offer to the vouchee to come in and defend, in default thereof the
voucher will hold him liable." Bouleris v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 318, 319, 256
N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
186 Moreno v. Galdorisi, 39 App. Div. 2d 450, 336 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't 1972); Meade
v. Roberts, 71 Misc. 2d 120, 335 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1972); Yarish v.
Dowling, 70 Misc. 2d 467, 333 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972) (mem.); DeLucia
v. Bundock, 168 N.Y.L.J. 12, July 19, 1972, at 13, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County);
Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972). In
Sanchez v. Hertz Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 333 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972)
(mem.), the court allowed the defendants' "cross-complaint" against a co-plaintiff.
187 Sorrentino v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
